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THE ARCHITECT IN THE DESIGN-BUILD
MODEL: DESIGNING AND BUILDING THE
CASE FOR STRICT LIABILITY IN TORT
The role of architectsinthe constructionprocess was limited traditionallyto the
design phase. The liability of such "traditionalarchitects"fordefective services is
usually limited to negligence. Although a few Jurisdictionsutilize an implied warranty standard,no traditionalarchitect is presently held strictly liable in tort. The
variableand unique natureof eachprojectandthe architect'sstatus as aprofessional
are often cited asjust~fcationsfor this reluctance to apply strict liability in tort.
When the entire constructionproject,from design to erection, isperformedby a
single entity-the "designer-builder'---thepolicyrationalesforwithholding strict tort
liabilitydo not apply. Massproducersof consumergoods are often held to a strict
liabilityin tort standardsimilarto that expressed in section 402,4 ofthe Restatement
(Second) of Torts because of theirinherent control over the manufacturingand distributionprocesses. An architect designer-butlder can exercise a similar degree of
control over allphases of the constructionproject. The architect designer-builderis,
in section 4024s terms, a "seller engaged in the business of selling ... a product"-with thatproduct being thefinished building. This Note extensively analyzes
the liabilityofarchitects/ordefective work andconcludes that, whenfunctioning as a
designer-builder,the architectshould be held to a strict liability in tort standard

INTRODUCTION

THE ARCHITECT'S' professional status directly relates to the
nature of the services provided to his or her clients.2 Under the
traditional model,' the architect is held to a negligence, or "professional," standard4 of liability--the only measure most jurisdictions apply to determine an architect's liability for defective
services.- These jurisdictions refuse to apply strict liability-either
implied warranty or strict liability in tort-reasoning that the rationales supporting strict liability are not applicable to the rendition of traditional architectural services.6
1. This Note concerns professionals in the building industry referred to for purposes
of this Note as architects. The discussion and conclusions, however, apply equally to engineers and other construction professionals. There is little practical significance between the
term "architect" and "engineer" when both perform design and supervisory functions. See
C. DUNHAM, R. YOUNG & J. BOCKRATH, CONTRACTS, SPECIFICATIONS, AND LAW FOR
ENGINEERS

2.
3.
4.
5.
6.

425 (3d ed. 1979).

See infra note 20 and
See infra notes 13-24
See infra notes 28-32
See infra notes 40-45
See infra notes 54-63

accompanying text.
and accompanying text.
and accompanying text.
and accompanying text.
and accompanying text.
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This Note focuses on the architect as designer-builder 7 and the
effect this nontraditional model of providing building services will
have on professionals operating within its scope. The fundamental changes which the design-build model creates will be examined.' Following an exploration of the policies supporting a
negligence standard of liability in light of the changes caused by
the design-build model,9 the Note shows that courts presently
hold designer-builders to an implied warranty standard of liability
for construction and design defects.10 The Note argues that the
designer-builder can better absorb the costs associated with defective products than can the traditional architect." By analyzing
the policy rationales behind strict tort liability, the Note concludes
that designer-builders should be held strictly liable in tort for defects resulting in injury. 2

I.

THE TRADITIONAL MODEL

To understand the fundamental changes the design-build
model brings to the construction industry, it is necessary to review
the traditional model of providing architectural services. This
provides a basis for comparing the increased liability exposure of
designer-builders.
A. HistoricalDevelopment andthe TraditionalModel
The architect's relationship to the building process has historically vacillated between mere design to actual participation in the
erection of the building; illustrating that when an architect associates too closely with the erection of a project, his or her privileged
professional status is threatened. The ancient cultures of Egypt,
Greece, and Rome viewed the architect as a professional 3 whose
responsibilities extended only to the design and general supervision of the construction process.' 4 The guild system of the Middle
7. The term "designer-builder" is used in this Note to describe the single entity under
the design-build model of building services, see infra notes 64-217 and accompanying text,
that provides both design and construction services. For a general discussion of the attributes of the designer-builder, see infra notes 65-70 and accompanying text.
8. See infra notes 64-89 and accompanying text.
9. See infra notes 90-112 and accompanying text.
10. See infra notes 113-44 and accompanying text.
11. See infra notes 148-220 and accompanying text.
12. See infra text accompanying and following note 230.
13. S.KosToF, THE ARCHITECT: CHAPTERS IN THE HISTORY OF THE PROFESSION 30
(1977).
14. Kostof recounts that "[a]t least in a supervisory sense, the architect led an army of
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Ages destroyed the architect's privileged professional standing.' 5
Architects regained their professional standing during the Renaissance, when the separation of design and supervision duties from
other construction-related functions was reestablished.
The European concept of the architect as a professional, separate and distinct from the builder, carried over to the colonies,

although most colonial construction was performed by. designerbuilders.' 6 The modem embodiment of the traditional model of
architectural services took form during the Industrial Revolution,
when the division of labor, the development of the leisure class,
and the growth of cities led to architectural sophistication.
The traditional model is the predominant form of architectural
practice today.' 7 The owner, the architect, and the contractor
form the foundational triad of the traditional model, with custom
and contractual obligation defining the responsibilities of each.'"
The owner usually delineates the project requirements and obtains sufficient financing to cover development costs. The owner
also provides the architect and contractor with full legal, utility,
and physical information regarding the building site.' 9 The architect creates and coordinates the building design and construction
documents-the building drawings and specifications. The architect's responsibilities also include observation at the building site
to ensure that the actual construction complies with the construccraftsmen and specialists in the manufacture and assembly of the stones that made the
gleaming marvels of the Greek landscape." Id. at 24-25.
15. "The notable shift of the profession since the collapse of the Roman Empire-[was] from an intellectual pursuit that required a liberal education as a base, to an
empirical skill that could be learned within the restricted compass of apprenticeship." Id.
at 60. The medieval architect not only oversaw the design of the project, but also worked
alongside the other members of the guilds as one of their own. Id. at 6 1.
16. R. MCLAUGHLIN, ARCHITECT 79 (1967). The author notes that "[w]hat made him

a professional architect was his method of preparing plans and taking bids from builders.
Before that, the practice was for an owner to secure competitive packages from a designercraftsman, who submitted a design and a price together." Id.
17. See Kahn, Introduction. The ChangingRole of the Architect, 23 ST. Louis U.L.J.
216, 216 (1979). Kahn states:
In comparatively recent times this concept [master builder] has been fragmented. No one person is now in charge of the project from conception to completion. While the architect was formerly the builder, it is now the contractor who
is in charge of the actual erection of the structure, and the architect is primarily
retained to provide the design for a proposed project and to lend his assistance in
its implementation.
Id.
18. See infra note 23.
19. Seegeneraly AMERICAN INSTITUTE OF ARCHITECTS, ARCHITECT'S HANDBOOK OF
PROFESSIONAL PRACTICE (1969); C. COWGILL & B. SMALL, ARCHITECTURAL PRACTICE (3d
ed. 1959).
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tion documents. 20 The contractor's primary responsibilities include erecting the project according to the construction
documents, supervising and directing the work at the building site,
and selecting the means, methods, and techniques of erecting the
project .2z The contractor also assumes responsibility for the safe

progress of the project and thus, a safe working environment for
his or her employees.2 2 A contractor typically acts in one of two

distinct capacities: as a general contractor, responsible for the entire project through control of various subcontractors, or as one of
several prime contractors, each responsible for a particular aspect
of the project.
Standardized contracts have formalized these distinct responsibilities in the traditional model.2 3 The architect's tort liability is
determined by whether these standardized contractual responsibilities, express or implied, are fulfilled. 4
B. Tort Liability of the TraditionalArchitect

Most jurisdictions hold an architect operating in the traditional model to only a negligence standard when determining liability for defects in the performance of architectural services.25
While some courts impose strict liability based on breach of an
2 6 no traditional architect has been held strictly
implied warranty,
27
liable in tort.
20. AMERICAN INSTITUTE OF ARCHITECTS, ARCHITECT'S HANDBOOK OF PROFESSIONAL PRACTICE (1969); AMERICAN INSTITUTE OF ARCHITECTS, GENERAL CONDITIONS

OF THE CONTRACT FOR CONSTRUCTION A201 (1976 ed.); C. COWGILL & B. SMALL, supra
note 19.
21. See AMERICAN INSTITUTE OF ARCHITECTS, GENERAL CONDITIONS OF THE CONTRACT FOR CONSTRUCTION A201 (1976 ed.).
22. Some courts, however, have imposed liability upon the architect for his responsibility to supervise the progress of the project and thereby to insure its safe progress through
control of the methods of construction. The architect may exert this control by stopping
the work for noncompliance, or intervening to ensure compliance, with the construction

documents. See Note, Liability ofDesgn Professionals-TheNecessity ofFault, 58 IOWA L.
REv. 1221, 1240 (1973).
23. See AMERICAN INSTITUTE OF ARCHITECTS, STANDARD FORM OF AGREEMENT
BETWEEN OWNER AND ARCHITECT B141 (1977 ed.); AMERICAN INSTITUTE OF ARCHITECTS, STANDARD FORM OF AGREEMENT BETWEEN OWNER AND CONTRACToR-A STIPULATED SUM AI01 (1977 ed.); AMERICAN INSTITUTE OF ARCHITECTS, GENERAL
CONDITIONS OF THE CONTRACT FOR CONSTRUCTION A201 (1976 ed.).
24. See generally Note, supra note 22 (general survey of design professional's
liability).

25. See infra notes 28-45 and accompanying text.
26. See infra notes 46-49 and accompanying text.
27. See infra notes 50-63 and accompanying text.
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1. The TraditionalArchitect and the Negligence Standard
The professional status of the traditional architect determines
the negligence standard applied in assessing liability for defective
services.2 8 This standard states that
[t]he undertaking of an architect implies that he possesses skill
and ability, including taste, sufficient to enable him to perform
the required services at least ordinarily and reasonably well;
and that he will exercise and apply in the given case his skill
and ability, his judgment and taste, reasonably and without neglect. But the undertaking does not imply or warrant a satisfactory result.2 9
This standard was applied in Gagne v. Bertran3 ° where a
driller of soil test holes failed to discover the presence of fill dirt
on the building site, necessitating the installation of a more expensive foundation system than originally planned. The California
Supreme Court, noting that the plaintiffs had "purchase[d] service, not insurance,"'" declined to impose strict liability. Limiting
the professional's liabilty to negligence,3 2 the court reasoned that,
given the nature of the services provided, it was unrealistic to ex33
pect infallibility.
The liability of traditional architects was further limited by the
requirement that injured recipients of architectural services
demonstrate contractual privity. 34 The courts, however, employed
several methods to circumvent this requirement, thereby allowing
third parties to directly sue the negligent architect.35 The privity
28. See Chapel v. Clark, 117 Mich. 638, 640, 76 N.W. 62, 62 (1898); Bell, Professional
Negligence ofArchitects and Engineers, 12 VAND. L. REv. 711 (1959); Note, Professional
Negligence, 121 U. PA. L. REV. 627, 633 (1973).
29. Coombs v. Beede, 89 Me. 187, 188, 36 A. 104, 105 (1896).
30. 43 Cal. 2d 481, 275 P.2d 15 (1954).
31. Id. at 489, 275 P.2d at 21.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. The privity doctrine was enunciated in Winterbottom v. Wright, 152 Eng. Rep.
402 (Ex. 1842), where the court held that one not in contractual privity with another would
be barred from recovery. Id. at 405. Thus, the injured mailcoach driver was refused recovery from the negligent coach repairman due to lack of privity since the repairman's contract was between himself and the mailcoach's owner. The privity requirement was
routinely applied to architects by the courts. See, e.g., Geare v. Sturgis, 14 F.2d 256 (D.C.
Cir. 1926).
35. These doctrines included misrepresentation, where the architect was held liable
for injuries to third persons if he or she made representations which cause injury to persons
like the plaintiff who reasonably relied upon those representations. Alternatively, a third
party beneficiary doctrine was used whereby a third party could maintain an action against
the architect if the contract manifested an intent to benefit such a party. Note, supra note
22, at 1224.
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requirement was eventually abandoned in architectural negligence actions in the 1950's.3 6
Notwithstanding the demise of the privity requirement and the

stated clarity of the traditional architect's standard of duty liability is often dependent on the parties involved and the particular
service provided.37 Legal problems arise typically in five distinct

service categories: cost prediction, design, arbitration, adminstration and certification, and supervision of construction.38 The nature of these functions have underscored recent judicial attempts

to extend the 39traditional architect's liability from negligence to
strict liability.
2. The TraditionalArchitect andImplied Warranty

Most jurisdictions refuse to increase the standard of liability
for defective architectural services from negligence to implied

warranty. In City of Mounds View v. Walifarvi,40 an architect was
employed to design an addition to the city hall. After completion,
moisture problems occurred which necessitated extensive re-

pairs.4 ' In declining to impose an implied warranty standard, the
court noted that "[t]he majority position limits the liability of ar-

chitects and others rendering 'professional' services to those situations in which the professional is negligent in the provision of his
or her services."'4 2 Reasoning that professionals deal with "inex36. Inman v. Binghamton Hous. Auth., 3 N.Y.2d 137, 143 N.E.2d 895, 164 N.Y.S.2d
699 (1957) (leading case eliminating privity as a defense in architectural malpractice actions). One commentator observed that
[1liability was predicated upon the establishment of the elements of negligence
and the existence of a legally recognized relationship or privity with the architect.
The duty of the architect was extended so that in the preparation of plans and
specifications the exercise of ordinary care in design was for the protection of any
person who foreseeably could be injured by the designer's failure to exercise such
care.

Note, supra note 22, at 1275 (emphasis added); see also MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co.,
217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1906) (recovery allowed for damages suffered by automobile's owner notwithstanding lack of privity between owner and manufacturer). See generally Note, Architects' and Engineers' Third Party Negligence Liability-The Fall of the
House ofPrivily, 10 W. REs. L. RPv. 563, 568-71 (1959).
37. Note, supra note 22, at 1229.
38. Id.
39. See Lehr, The Application of ProductsLiabilityPrincoilesto ProfessionalServices,
48 INs. CouNs. J. 434, 445 (1981); Note, Liabilitiesof CalforniaBuilding Contractorsand
ConstructionProfessionals: The Needfor Equality in Legal Responsibilities, 15 CAL. W.L.
REV. 305, 306 (1979); Note, Products and the Professional- Strict Liability in the SalesService Hybrid Transaction, 24 HASTNGS LJ.-111, 132 (1972).
40. 263 N.W.2d 420 (Minn. 1978).
41. Id. at 422.
42. Id.
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act sciences" and must rely upon their skilled judgment to perform their duties, 43 the court deemed error to be an inescapable
possibility." Viewing the law as requiring only the skill and judg-

ment exercised by similarly situated professionals, the court felt it
more equitable that purchasers of architectural services bear the
risk of unforeseen circumstances which damage the finished
project.45
A minority of jurisdictions do impose an implied warranty

standard upon traditional architects, justifying the result as flowing from the common and fair dealings between the contracting
parties. 46 In Broyles v. Brown EngineeringCo .,4 the court held an
engineer strictly liable under an implied warranty theory for producing defective plans4 8 when the engineer's faulty drawings of a
subdivision's drainage system caused extensive damage. The
court observed that because the professional engineer held himself
out as an expert, it was not unreasonable to expect a guarantee of
satisfactory results. 49 An implied warranty standard, therefore,

requires the professional to impliedly warrant that his or her
drawings and specifications will be sufficient for their intended

purpose.
3.

The TraditionalArchitect and Strict Liability in Tort

No jurisdiction subjects the traditional architect to strict tort
liability5° similar to that expressed in section 402A of the Restate43. Id. at 424.
44. Id.
45. Additionally, the court reasoned that because of the nature of the architect-client
relationship, an injured third party need not search through a distribution chain for the
source of his problem. The inability of consumers to locate the source of a product's defect
has been cited as an underlying rationale for imposing strict liability upon manufacturers.
See infra note 58 and accompanying text. Furthermore, the court observed that, unlike a
mass-producer, who can test and refine his product before it reaches the consumer, each
project confronting the architect presents its own unique situation. 263 N.W.2d at 424-25.
46. See Broyles v. Brown Eng'g Co., 275 Ala. 35, 151 So. 2d 767 (1963); Federal Mogul Corp. v. Universal Constr. Co., 376 So. 2d 716 (Ala. Civ. App. 1979).
47. 275 Ala. 35, 151 So. 2d 767 (1963).
48. Id. at 40, 151 So. 2d at 772.
49. The court stated:
A contracting civil engineer employed to survey and submit plans and specifications for drainage of an area of land as here involved, when he accepts employment, being competent and qualified as he holds himself out to be, should expect
to be charged with a guaranty of reasonable results, and we think that in his
dealings and in common fairness he does so expect. Resistance as here to accountability does not dissipate the fairness and justice of such an implication.
.d.
50. For a discussion of strict tort liability, see Prosser, The Assault Upon the Citadel
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ment (Second) of Torts.' Section 402A focuses on the condition
of the product5 2 rather than the actions of the other party. Sub-

jecting the traditional architect to strict tort liability, therefore,
would require a showing that the architect's product-his services-were 53
defective and "unreasonably dangerous to the user or
consumer."
The courts have found, however, that the rationales underlying the strict tort standard are inapplicable to services. 4 In La
Rossa v. Scient~fc Design Co. ,51 the court determined an engineer-

ing firm's liability under negligence principles.56 The decedent's
wife in La Rossa sought to hold the design engineers of a phthalic
anhydride processing plant strictly liable for her husband's death,
which resulted from his exposure to vanadium during the plant's
construction.5 The court observed that consumers of professional
(StrictLiability to the Consumer), 69 YALE L.J. 1099 (1960); Prosser, The Fallof the Citadel
(Strict Liability to the Consumer), 50 MINN. L. REv.791 (1966).
51. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965) states:
Special Liability of Seller of Product for Physical Harm to User or Consumer
(1)One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous
to the user or consumer or to his property is subject to liability for physical harm
thereby caused to the ultimate user or consumer, or to his property, if
(a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a product, and
(b) it is expected to and does reach the user or consumer without substantial
change in the condition in which it is sold.
(2) The rule stated in Subsection (1) applies although
(a) the seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation and sale of his
product, and
(b) the user or consumer has not bought the product from or entered into any
contractual relation with the seller.
52. Lehr, supra note 39, at 434. Lehr states:
Strict liability ("liability without fault") does not necessarily mean that the defendant is faultless (not culpable), but merely that the plaintiff does not have to
prove fault in order to recover. Strict liability in products deals with the condition
of an object, whereas negligence deals with the actions of a reasonableman.
Id. (emphasis in original).
53. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A(l) (1965). This requires architects to
insure that their services are free from any and all "unreasonably dangerous" defects. This
should be contrasted with a negligence action, where the injured party must establish the
architects' failure to exercise the standard of care expected of similarly situated architects.
See Lehr, supra note 39, at 449.
54. But see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A comment c (1965). The comment indicates that
the seller, by marketing his product for use and consumption, has undertaken and
assumed a special responsibility toward any member of the consuming public
who may be injured by it;
that the public has the right to and does expect, in the
case of products which it needs and for which it is forced to rely upon the seller,
that reputable sellers will stand behind their goods.
Id.; see infra notes 122-31 and accompanying text.
55. 402 F.2d 937 (3d Cir. 1968).
56. Id. at 943.
57. Id. at 939.
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services are not confronted with the burdens facing purchasers of
mass produced goods, who must trace the article through the

channels of trade to an original manufacturer in order to hold the
responsible party liable for the defect.5 8 Thus, the performance of

traditional architectural services is not closely analogous to the
manufacture of goods, and therefore the policy rationales under-

lying strict liability in tort are not fully applicable.
Those courts which impose a strict liability in tort standard on
the performance of commercial services5 9 still refuse to extend this

standard to the performance ofprofessional services. In Newmark
v. Gimbel's, Inc. ,60 a case involving a defective hair care product,
the court applied a strict tort standard to the defendant-operator's
use of the defective product, irrespective of the service aspect involved in the case. The transaction was viewed as "a hybrid par-

taking of incidents of a sale and a service."61 Traditional
restrictions against the application of a strict liability standard to a
wholly service arrangement, therefore, were less compelling. Although it considered the plaintiff to be a consumer of both the
manufacturer's product and the professional's services, the court

expressly declined to apply a strict liability in tort standard to the
performance of professional services. The court reasoned that the
performance of pxofessional services is not routine in nature, nor
are the variables encountered in the application of the professional's judgment standardized.6 2 Finally, the court determined
58. Id. at 942-43. But see 2 F. HARPER & F. JAMES, THE LAW OF ToRTS 794-95
(1956), where they state:
There is a growing belief, however, that in this mechanical age the victims of
accidents can, as a class, ill afford to bear the loss; that the social consequences of
uncompensated loss are of far greater importance than the amount of the loss
itself; and that better results will come from distributing such losses among all the
beneficiaries of the mechanical process than by letting compensation turn upon
an inquiry into fault.
Id.
59. See Newmark v. Gimbel's, Inc., 54 N.J. 585, 258 A.2d 697 (1969); Note, Products
and the Professional-Strict Liability in the Sales-Service Hybrid Transaction, 24 HASTINGS
LJ. 111 (1972).
60. 54 N.J. 585, 258 A.2d 697 (1969). Here a patron of a beauty shop was given a
permanent wave treatment which caused hair loss and skin burns (contact dermatitis). Id.
at 589-91, 258 A.2d at 699. The plaintiff argued that, notwithstanding the presence of a
service element in the transaction, there was an implied warranty of fitness extending to the
products involved in the rendition of services.
61. Id. at 593, 258 A.2d at 701.
62. The court described the vast difference between commercial services and professional services:
[The professional's] performance is not mechanical or routine because each patient requires individual study and formulation of an informed judgment as to the
physical or mental disability or condition presented, and the course of treatment
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that the policies underlying strict liability in tort did not justify its
application to professionals.63
II. THE DESIGN-BUILD MODEL
The architect designer-builder is more closely involved with

the construction phase of the project than is a traditional architect.
Because of the services provided by the architect designer-build-

ers, a strict liability in tort standard arguably should apply when
the buildings they produce cause injury. Since architect designer-

builders are analogous to manufacturers, an analysis of the policy
rationales underlying strict liability in tort further supports its application in the design-build context.'
A.

The Design-BuildApproach

The distinguishing feature of the design-build model is the absence of the triangular relationship inherent within the traditional
model. In the design-build model, the owner executes a single
contract with either the architect or the contractor for both the
design and construction of the project.65 This single contract feaneeded.... Such men are not producers or sellers of property in any reasonably
acceptable sense of the term. In a primary sense they furnish services in the form
of an opinion of the patient's condition based upon their experienced analysis of
the objective and subjective complaints, and in the form of recommended and, at
times, personally administered medicines and treatment .... Thus their paramount function-the essence of their function-ought to be regarded as the furnishing of opinions and services.
Id. at 596-97, 258 A.2d at 703.
63. The court stated:
In our judgment, the nature of the services, the utility of and the need for them,
involving as they do the health and even survival of many people, are so important to the general welfare as to outweigh in the policy scale any need for the
imposition on dentists and doctors of the rules of strict liability in tort.
Id. at 597, 258 A.2d at 703.
64. But cf. supra text following note 58 (since traditionalarchitects are not analogous
to goods manufacturers, application of strict liability in tort should not be applicable).
65. The contract between the owner and the designer-builder may be arranged in
three different forms. Under the "competitive bidding" option, the design-build entity is
chosen based on competitive proposals from various designer-builders. The owner may
pre-establish the project's requirements or define them after the designer-builder is chosen.
The primary advantage of the competitive bidding option is the ability to establish the
project's costs in its initial stages, thus allowing public entities with fixed funding to use the
design-build model. The owner retains responsiblity for project financing throughout the
design-construction process. See AMERICAN INSTITUTE OF ARCHITECTS, PROJECT DELIVERY APPROACHES 22 (1976).
Closely related to the competitive bidding option is the "direct selection" option, in
which the owner selects the designer-builder through negotiation. Project requirements are
established before or concurrent with the negotiation process. The owner in the direct
selection process maintains an active role throughout the design-build process by adjusting
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ture contrasts with the traditional model 66 where separate entities
deliver design and construction services. 67 The design-build entity itself may assume two different forms: the "integrated services" entity, combining both design and construction functions, or
the "prime contractor" entity, where the designer-builder performs either the design or the construction function and subcontracts all other services.6 8 The architect in the design-build model
may serve as either the prime contractor-principal 69 or subcontractor-agent of the design-build entity.7"
Although it is a relatively recent development in the modem
construction industry, the design-build model is gaining almost
immediate acceptance in the marketplace7 ' due in part to its supeproject requirements to changing costs and by obtaining both construction and long term
financing for the project. Id.
A third type of design-build contract is the "turnkey" approach, so named because the
sole responsibilities of the owner are to take possession of the completed construction project, pay the contract price, and "turn the key in the door." The owner and designerbuilder enter into a fixed sum sales contract, whereby the owner provides the project requirements and the designer-builder produces the finished project. The turnkey contract
places the responsibility for design, construction, and the acquisition of a site, requisite
governmental approval, and interim construction financing on the designer-builder. Id.
66. See supra text accompanying notes 18-23.

67.

AMERICAN INSTITUTE OF ARCHITECTS, PROJECT DELIVERY APPROACHES

20

(1976). "In the design-build approach, the owner procures both design and construction
services at one time, from one entity, based on a statement of requirements. The proposal
and award tasks are moved 'up front'-directly following planning." Id.; Note, DesignBuild Contracts in Virginia, 14 U. RICH. L. REV. 791, 798 (1980).
68.

AMERICAN INSTITUTE OF ARCHITECTS, PROJECT DELIVERY APPROACHES 23-25

(1976).
69. This Note specifically focuses on the architect as the principal within the designbuild entity. As a principal, the architect designer-builder is at polar opposites from an
architect acting as the owner's agent. By analyzing the nature of design-build services,
which differs fundamentally from that provided by the traditional architect, it is apparent
that a strict liability standard should apply.
70. As agent for the design-build entity, the architect is analogous to his or her traditional counterpart, since the responsibilities of the respective parties are defined under
traditional contractual forms. The essential difference between the traditional model and
the architect as the designer-builder's subcontractor is the contracting parties. In the design-build model, the architect is the contractor's, and not the owner's, agent. Since the
architect, as the designer-builder subcontractor, retains traditional service characteristics,
the policy rationales for retaining a negligence-only standard still apply.
71. A 1975 survey revealed that of 383 recently erected construction projects valued at
$5,000,000 or more, 28% utilized the single contract, or design-build model. Most of the
design-build projects were manufacturing facilities, while only 15% of all nonmanufacturing facilities, such as office buildings and educational facilities, utilized this approach. See
Survey Measures Use OfDesign-Construct Contracts by Industry, AM. INST. ARCHITECTS J.,
Nov. 1975, at 6 (citing FORTUNE, CORPORATE PRACTICES AND ATTITUDES TowARDS INDUSTRIAL/COMMERCIAIL CONSTRUCTION

(1975)).
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rior economic advantages.7 2 The owner in the traditional model

must invest both time and money in planning and preparation
prior to the establishment of a project price.7 3 The linear, systematic nature of the traditional model, necessitating the completion
of one phase of the project before the next may commence, makes
its use very time consuming.' In highly inflationary times, any
delay associated with planning or erecting a project causes signifi-

cant increases in cost and a corresponding decrease in project
profitability.75
The design-build model, conversely, is not a phased, linear approach, but rather a systematic model where the planning, design,
and construction phases occur simultaneously.7 6 The integration
of the design and building functions permits responsive planning
in the early stages of the project and provides the designer-builder
with immediate time and cost information. Early access to this
information reduces the time required to modify or change project
requirements and, therefore, decreases the costs associated with
these changes.7 7 It is this inherent responsiveness to time-delay
72. See infra notes 79-84 and accompanying text.
73. The owner invests considerable time and money for planning and contracting
before the architect even releases the drawings and specifications for bid to prospective
contractors. See generally AMERICAN INSTITUTE OF ARCHITECTS, STANDARD FORM OF
AGREEMENT BETWEEN OWNER AND ARCHITECT

B141 (1977 ed.) (standard contract be-

tween owner and architect establishing contractual responsibilities of both parties).
74. Time and cost problems represent the traditonal model's most serious drawbacks.
Construction cannot begin before completion of the design phase, which must await com-

pletion of the programming phase. See

AMERICAN INSTITUTE OF ARCHITECTS, PROJECT
DELIVERY APPROACHES 6-10 (1976). Along with the desire to compress the time frame is

the need to reduce construction financing. When construction is completed, construction
financing is "rolled over" into long term financing at reduced interest rates. See also Note,
supra note 67, at 797.
75. One commentator observes:
Inflation in construction and financing costs has placed a premium on speed in
the development process. Once the developer [owner] has decided to build, each
month's delay is a month's lost rent. But,. . . the financial penalties for delay are
much greater than mere loss of income .... By cutting design-construction time
from 24 to 18 months, and thereby generating early cash-flow receipts from a
building, a developer may cut his equity cash participation by as much as 30
percent. This cash-investment reduction increases financial leverage, or profitequity ratio, and leverage is the key to financially successful development.
C. GRIFFIN, DEVELOPMENT BUILDING: THE TEAM APPROACH

15 (1972).

76. Note, supra note 67, at 798.
77. This approach, where the various design and construction phases take place concurrently, is commonly referred to as "fast tracking." Under a fast track system, basic program requirements, such as building location on the site, utility locations, and overall
building parameters, are established first. Next, the foundation and structural system are
designed and released for bids. During construction of the building shell, planning and
design functions for the remainder of the project are completed. Thus, all three phases of
building activity-planning, design, and construction-occur simultaneously. "Fast track-
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costs which has accounted for the construction industry's rapid acceptance of the design-build model.
Beyond mere cost and time savings, the design-build model
fundamentally redefines the roles which the owner, architect, and
contractor occupy in the traditional model.7 8 One commentator
argues that the design-build model removes the internal conffict,
waste, and clouding of responsibility that is inherent between
these three entities.7 9 Moreover, this same commentator identifies
several significant advantages which the architect designer-builder
enjoys over the traditional architect, such as sufficient control over
design and construction functions to assure correct project performance. Additionally, the architect designer-builder would
purchase and assemble the building materials, thus insuring
proper selection and installation.8 ° The architect designerbuilder's control over construction methodology would include direct participation in creating safe working conditions. 8 Injured
employees would be compensated under workers' compensation
provisions, thus eliminating suits against architects by injured
workers over whom they had no control.8" The architect designerbuilder, furthermore, is in a stronger financial position than the
traditional architect.83 Significant cost savings by eliminating the
waste in communication during construction and combining the
profit from both the design and erection of the project provide the
architect designer-builder with greater remuneration than that
available to the traditional architect. 84
Notwithstanding these inherent advantages, through 1978 the
participation of architects in the design-build model was minimal.8 5 Established prohibitions to participation based on ethical
ing" also permits the early ordering of building elements which require lengthy appropriation periods, further decreasing construction time. Id. at 798-99.
78. See supra notes 74-75 and accompanying text.
79. See Merritt, Up Against the Wall, MasterBuilder: The Architect's Legal Status, 23
ST. Louis U.L.J. 384, 420 (1979).
80. Id. at 420-21.
81. Id. at 421.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. The majority of registered architects in the United States belong to the American
Institute of Architects (AIA)-a professional organization similar to the American Medical
Association or the American Bar Association. The AIA had a longstanding ethical prohibition against membership participation in design-build entities. "[Members] may not engage in building contracting where compensation, direct or indirect, is derived from profit
on labor and materials furnished in the building process." AMERICAN INSTITUTE OF ARCHITECTS, THE STANDARDS OF ETHICAL PRACTICE J330 (1974 ed.).
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concerns focused on the nature of the architect's relationship as
the owner's agent in the building process.86 Since these longstanding prohibitions to participation as designer-builders were recently lifted,8 7 the level of participation of architects in the designbuild model is expected to increase due to competitive pressures
from the marketplace.
The fundamental role changes produced when the traditional
architect becomes the architect designer-builder raise significant
questions regarding potential liability for defects in the project.
Commentators suggest that designer-builders would be liable for
injuries to workers at the work site, defaults which injure the
surety's interests, and failures in design or construction quality. 88
Thus, the designer-builder is wholly liable for deficiencies which
heretofore were the separate liabilities of the architect and the
contractor in the traditional model.89
B. The Existing Tort Liability of the Architect Designer-Builder
When determining the appropriate liability standard for an architect designer-builder most courts focus on the architect's professional status. The conclusiveness placed upon this status is
evident even in those jurisdictions unwilling to hold nonprofessional designer-builders strictly liable. Those jurisdictions, however, that impose an implied warranty standard on a
nonprofessional designer-builder refuse to impose a standard
higher than negligence to similarly situated professional designerbuilders. By examining the role of the designer-builder in light of
the policies underlying strict liability in tort, it becomes evident
that both professional and nonprofessional designer-builders
should be held to that strict standard.
1. The Designer-Builderand the Negligence Standard
A dichotomy exists in the standards used to determine the negligence of a professional and that of an ordinary, "reasonable person." The professional standard of care requires the exercise of
86. See Merritt, supra note 79, at 420.
87. After several years of discussion, the AIA voted in 1978 to allow its members to
engage in design-build transactions. See AMERICAN INSTITUTE OF ARCHITECTS, ETHICAL
PRINCIPLES 6J400 (1981).
88. Note, supra note 67, at 799.
89. See Merritt, supra note 79, at 421; Note, supra note 67, at 799.
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average professionally acceptable conduct,90 which is really "a
standard of minimum professionally acceptable conduct."9' Conversely, the ordinary "reasonable person" standard requires the
average, nonprofessional individual to exercise average, prudent
reasonable care. 92 Because this reasonable person's behavior must
not only be average, but also prudent, the nonprofessional is held
to a standard of care that is actually higher than that of the profes-

sional.93 The distinction between the professional standard and
the reasonable person standard is typically justified by a representation, implied to all professionals, that they will follow customary
procedures in their professional dealings. 94 Another justification
advanced is that the average person is incompetent to adequately
determine what is professional negligence without expert guidance from similarly situated professionals.9 5 Arguably, however,
once a professional performs services beyond the scope of his or
her customary professional services, these justifying rationales become inapplicable.
In Stuart v. Crestview Mutual Water Co 96 a professional standard was applied to a professional operating beyond the scope of
his usual services.97 The property owner in Stuart brought im-

plied warranty and negligence actions against the municipal water
corporation, the developer, and the engineer who designed, engi90. Curran, Professional Neglgence-Some General Comments, 12 VAND. L. REV.
535, 538 (1959).
91. Id. (emphasis in original).
92. Id. This requirement of average reasonable prudence is a stricter standard of conduct than mere average general conduct because the average individual must exhibit carefulness as an element of average general conduct. Moreover, to determine what is
reasonable, prudent conduct for a particular individual, distinctive physical characteristics,
such as blindness, are noted. See W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 151-52
(4th ed. 1971). At a minimum, an average, reasonable, prudent individual is imputed with
reasonable intelligence, see id. at 152-53, and note is accorded any additional knowledge
possessed due to special or surrounding circumstances. See Curran, supra note 90, at 537.
93. Curran observes that
[t]he
standard chosen for all professions would seem to be basically the same
.... It is the learning and skill "ordinarily possessed and exercised" by the
profession. This is a rather questionable standard .... [I]nthe "reasonable
man" concept, the law requires more than average conduct, it requires average
prudent conduct. This is "up the scale" from the average. Yet for professionals,
we seem to be satisfied with average or minimum acceptable conduct.
Curran, supra note 90, at 538 (emphasis in original).
94. See W. PROSSER, supra note 92, at 165.
95. Id.
96. 34 Cal. App. 3d 802, 110 Cal. Rptr. 543 (1973).
97. The court quoted the professional standard enunciated in Gagne v. Bertram, 43
Cal. 2d 481, 489, 275 P.2d 15, 21 (1954); see supra notes 30-33 and accompanying text.
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neered, and constructed the water distribution system. 98 The owner's property was destroyed by fire because the water supply and
pressure were inadequate. The California Court of Appeal affirmed the lower court's determination that the complaint9 9 did
not state a cause of action against the engineer for strict liability.
The court reached this result even though the engineer, by engaging in the business of construction, was performing an activity be-

yond the statutory sphere of engineering duties in California. 00
The court, thus, focused upon the professional status of the engineer and ignored the actual services rendered.1' t
While the Stuart court applied the professional standard to the
professional designer-builder, earlier, in Halliday v. Greene,1 2 it
had held a nonprofessional designer-builder accountable to the
higher reasonable person standard. In Halliday, a licensed general contractor planned, designed, constructed, and operated an
apartment complex. On two of the units, the designer-builder obtained a building code variance which reduced the number of
staircases required from two to one. During a fire at one of the
two units, the plaintiffs were injured while attempting to descend

the single staircase.1° The complaint alleged breach of an implied warranty of fitness for the unit as a whole and negligence in
the design and construction of the staircase. The court, however,

applied a negligence standard, rejecting the strict liability aspect
of the complaint."°

The court's standard was whether "the

98. 34 Cal. App. 3d at 805-06, 110 Cal. Rptr. at 545.
99. The proposed amended complaint stated:
Jansen Associates [the project engineers] are in the business of designing, engineering and constructing water development systems, and knew and intended that
the water distribution system would be used to supply water for fire protection
services for persons such as plaintiffs who lived in the Crestview water area.
Id.
100. California law defines engineering duties as including the planning, design, and
supervision of construction-not the actual consiruction itself. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §
6701 (West Supp. 1983). Construction supervision, moreover, "does not include responsibility for the superintendence of construction processes." Id. § 6703.1 (West 1975). By
actually engaging in construction, therefore, a California engineer is arguably performing
an activity beyond the scope of his or her duties.
101. The court characterized the engineer's contractual obligations as professional services which could not be analogized to manufacturers. Thus, the engineer was not in the
best position vis-a-vis the consumer to spread the costs associated with building defects. 34
Cal. App. 3d at 811, 110 Cal. Rptr. at 549.
102. 244 Cal. App. 2d 482, 53 Cal. Rptr. 267 (1966).
103. Id. at 483-84, 53 Cal. Rptr. at 269.
104. In holding that strict liability does not apply to the landlord-tenant relationship,
the court relied instead upon the ability of the tenant to make an effective inspection of the
premises prior to the establishment of the leasehold. The court felt that the essence of the
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builder . . . knew, or as an experienced builder should have
known" that particular safeguards were necessary in the design
and construction of a staircase. 0 5 Thus, the court applied a reasonable person standard °0 6 -arguably a higher standard than the
professional standard' 07-to a nonprofessional designer-builder.
The application of two different standards of negligence to
similarly situated designer-builders cannot be justified by the ra08
tionales supporting the distinction between the two standards.
A single standard should apply to both the professional and nonprofessional designer-builder when they engage in identical transactions.' 0 9 The reasonable person standard both achieves
uniformity of treatment and accommodates the inherent differences between professional and nonprofessional designer-builders." 0 Use of a reasonable person standard would hold an
architect designer-builder, whose skills and knowledge differ from
that of a contractor designer-builder to the standard of care that a
prudent person with the same skill and knowledge would have ex-

hibited in a similar transaction.
The underlying assumption of the above discussion is that a

strict liability standard is inappropriate for the architect designerbuilder."' This assumption has been questioned by a growing
number of jurisdictions which hold designer-builders strictly lia2
ble for product defects." 1
cause of action was based in negligence and the landlord's duty was to inform the tenant
about latent defects. Id. at 486-87, 53 Cal. Rptr. at 271.
105. Id. at 487, 53 Cal. Rptr. at 271.
106. See supra note 92 and accompanying text.
107. See supra note 93 and accompanying text.
108. See supra notes 94-95 and accompanying text.
109. See Note, Liabilitiesof CalforniaBuilding Contractorsand ConstructionProfessionals: The Needfor Equality in LegalResponsibilities,15 CAL. W.L. REv. 305, 305- 06 (1979).
The author argues that when the contractor's and professional's tasks have become indistinguishable, and the professional receives the benefit of preferential treatment due to his
or her status as a professional, an inequitable burden is placed upon the contractor. Id. at
306.
110. Arguably, the designer-builder could be treated as another classification of professional, with the professional standard applied uniformly to all designer-builders. This option, however, does not recognize that, unlike most professions, not all designer-builders
have similar qualifications, skills, or educational backgrounds. Therefore, until standardization of designer-builder qualifications occurs, it is more equitable to judge each individual designer-builder on his or her respective qualifications.
111. See, e.g., Stuart v. Crestview Mut. Water Co., 34 Cal.App. 3d 802, 110 Cal. Rptr.
543 (1973); supra notes 96-101 and accompanying text.
112. See Schipper v. Levitt & Sons, Inc., 44 N.J. 70, 207 A.2d 314 (1965); infra notes
158-60 and accompanying text.
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2.

The Designer-Builderand Implied Warranty

Courts generally refuse to hold traditional architects to an implied warranty standard," 3 asserting that the indeterminate factors architects must manipulate" 4 make it impossible for them to
guarantee a result. A warranty action focuses on the relative positions of the buyer and seller. The court examines the seller's representations and breach occurs when these representations are not
fulfilled.
In refusing to invoke an implied warranty standard to
architects, most courts reason that when an architect, as a professional, makes representations regarding his or her services, it is
with the implied understanding that they will merely reach the
level of competence of the profession as a whole. As one court
stated:
With respect to the alleged "implied warranty of fitness," we
see no reason for application of this theory in circumstances
involving professional libability ....
[A] professional, does
not "warrant" his service or the tangible evidence of his skill to
be "merchantable" or "fit for an intended use." These are
terms uniquely applicable to goods. Rather, in the preparation
of design and specifications as the basis of construction, the
.. . architect "warrants" that he will or has exercised his skill
according to a certain standard of care, that he acted reasonably and without !neglect. Breach of this "warranty" occurs if
he was negligent 16
Any reliance, therefore, by the consumer on representations which
113. See supra notes 40-45 and accompanying text.
114. See City of Mounds View v. Walijarvi, 263 N.W.2d 420, 424 (Minn. 1978); supra
notes 40-45 and accompanying text.
115. Prosser states:
[A]ny affirmation of fact made by the seller concerning the goods, including any

description of them, and any promise relating to them, becomes an express warranty if it is relied on by the buyer as part of the bargain. The implied warranties
of quality are reduced to two: a warranty that the goods are fit for the particular
purpose of the buyer, when that purpose is made known to the seller, and the
latter knows that the buyer is relying upon his skill or judgment to select and
furnish suitable goods; and a warranty that the goods are of merchantable quality,
when they are bought from one who deals in goods of that description.
It is essential to a warranty that the buyer shall rely on the seller's express or
implied assurance. There is no recovery where the defects in the goods are known
to buyer or obvious to him; or where he elects to make his own inspection and
rely solely on it.
W. PROSSER, supra note 92, at 636-37.

116. Audlane Lumber & Builders Supply, Inc. v. D.E. Britt Assoc., Inc., 168 So. 2d 333,
335 (Fla. App. 1964), cert. denied, 173 So. 2d 146 (Fla. 1965). InAudlane Lumber, a truss
fabricator argued for imposition of an implied warranty of fitness on the plans which it had
purchased from an engineer. Id. at 335. The fabricator was injured when defects and
structural inadequacies were discovered in the trusses fabricated from the plans. Id. at 334.
The court held that implied warranty is not applicable to professionals. Id. at 335.
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exceeds this implied understanding are found to be unreasonable
unless the professional expressly and unequivocably warranted a
specific result." 17
When a traditional architect becomes an architect designerbuilder, the above justifications for withholding the implied war-

ranty standard may no longer apply. Regardless of their status as
professionals, an implied warranty standard may be justifiably applied to architect designer-builders because of the extra services

performed which traditional architects do not. Courts have begun
to recognize this reasoning. For example, in Robertson Lumber
Co. v. Stephen FarmersCooperativeElevator Co."'1 a lumber company agreed to design and build a grain storage building and
hired a subcontractor to perform the actual construction. The
building collapsed after completion when loaded to ninety five
percent of its represented capacity. 119 The Minnesota Supreme
Court affirmed the lower court's finding of an implied warranty of
fitness that the building would be designed and constructed to accommodate the intended use.' 2 0 The court determined that it was
appropriate to impose an implied warranty standard when: (1)
the contractor holds him or herself out as competent, (2) the owner has no particular expertise in design and construction, (3) the
owner provides no plans or specifications, and (4) the owner conveys his or her reliance on the skill and experience of the contractor after explaining the specific purpose of the building.' 2 ' Under
the Robertson test, an implied warranty of fitness for a particular
use should apply regardless of the designer-builder's professional
117. Curran states:

In some professional areas, the mere happening of a bad result does give rise
to a justifiable claim. This is most apt to happen where the defendant warrants
his work or makes certain types of representation. The most common is the accountant who certifies financial condition. He is often found liable in damages in
such cases if the financial condition of a business is not certified, even though he
himself (and his employees) were not negligent. The basis is express warranty or
a representation "of one's own knowledge" for which strict liability is imposed.
Such a situation can apply to engineers and lawyers as well where they make
certifications or prepare reports.
Curran, supra note 90, at 542.
118. 274 Minn. 17, 143 N.W.2d 622 (1966).
119. The court described the nature of the defendant's involvement: "Specifying the
type of building was the co-op's only participation, and it was left entirely to the lumber
company to supply not only appropriate material but a building contractor to do the actual
work. The co-op did, by the terms of its acceptance, approve the contractor proposed." Id.
at 22, 143 N.W.2d at 625. Based on these facts, the lumber company fits into the description
of a design-build firm. See supra text accompanying note 68.
120. 274 Minn. at 24, 143 N.W.2d at 626.
121. Id.
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status. Indeed, the court in City of Mounds View v. Walffarvi 2 2
relied on Robertson to distinguish between the representations of a
professional and a designer-builder regarding their respective
services. Contracts like those in Robertson, the court argued, are

for general contracting services, not for "professional services,"
and, as such, are subject to the implied warranty standard.123 By
implicitly affirming the applicability of an implied warranty standard, the Walifarvi court, through its reliance on Robertson, em-

phasized that the dispositive factor is not "professional" status,
but the services actually performed by the designer-builder.
An implied warranty has been applied to the "nonprofessional" designer-builder since the 1800's. 2 4 A leading case imposing an implied warranty standard is Kennedy v. Bowling.'2 5 In
Kennedy, the designer-builder agreed to procure a design 126 and
construct a warehouse for the plaintiff which would support the
storage of heavy chemicals. 2 7 After completion of the building,
122. 263 N.W.2d 420 (Minn. 1978); see supra notes 40-45 and accompanying text.
123. 263 N.W.2d at 424 n.4.
124. Eg., Kellogg Bridge Co. v. Hamilton, 110 U.S. 108 (1884). In Kellogg Bridge, the
Court held that the bridge coinpany impliedly warranted that the pilings which it designed
and built were reasonably suited for their contemplated use. Id. at 119. The bridge company contracted with the Lake Shore and Michigan Southern Railroad Company to construct a bridge over the Maumee River in Toledo, Ohio. After the bridge company
designed the bridge and installed the pilings to support the center span towers, it contracted
with Hamilton to finish the bridge. Id. at 108. Hamilton, using the design supplied by
Kellogg, had completed the center span when the towers collapsed because the pilings
failed. The bridge collapse created additional expenses which Hamilton sought to collect
from the bridge company on an implied warranty theory. Id. at 110. The Court, in applying an implied warranty standard, stated:
The law, therefore, implies a warranty that this false work [the pilings] was reasonably suitable for such use as was contemplated by both parties. It was constructed for a particular purpose, and was sold to accomplish that purpose; and it
is intrinsically just that the company, which held itself out as possessing the requisite skill to do work of that kind, and therefore as having special knowledge of its
own workmanship, should be held to indemnify its venlee against latent defects,
arising from the mode of construction ....
Id. at 119. Thus, the Court applied an implied warranty standard to a designer-builder
and expressly rejected the rule of caveat emptor in this transaction.
125. 319 Mo. 401, 4 S.W.2d 438 (1928).
126. After Bowling accepted Kennedy's offer he obtained the services of an architect,
Mr. Braecklein, to prepare the design for the building. Thus, by subcontracting out the
design services, Bowling created a "prime contractor" design-build entity. See supra text
accompanying note 68.
127. The operative terms of the agreement were:
I hereby propose that you shall build on my property.., one three-story
building, and contiguously one one-story building according to plans and specifications to be furnished by you at your expense and approved by me, you to buy
all material and to employ all the labor used in the construction of said building
Id. at 406, 4 S.W.2d at 440.

CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 33:116

the floors could not support the weight of the chemicals and had
to be reinforced. 2 8 The court held that the designer-builder had
impliedly warranted a warehouse sufficient for its intended purpose. 129 In reaching this result, the Kennedy court determined
that the owner had relied upon the designer-builder's representations of his skill and judgment. 13 0 Moreover, this result was
reached without regard for the unique conditions the designerbuilder encountered in the performance of his contract-the same
type of factors an architect encounters in the performance of his or
her services and which the Wa4liarvi court reasoned dictated only
a negligence standard.' 3 '
The Kennedy court's holding was recently affirmed and extended by the Missouri Supreme Court in O'Dell v. Custom Builders Corp.132 In O'Dell, the designer-builder, Custom, contracted
to provide the overall design and outside shell construction of the
residence, excluding the foundations and interior finishes.' 33 After the design was completed, and although not required by the
contract to do so, Custom sent one of its employees to select the
location of the house on the owner's property. This same employee also arranged for excavation and installation of the building's foundation. When the foundation system failed, the court
determined that the cause was Custom's failure to modify the design of the foundation system, which it had supplied, to the conditions at the site.' 34 The court held that Custom impliedly
128. Id. at 411-12, 4 S.W.2d at 443.
129. Id. at 418, 4 S.W.2d at 445.
130. The court stated:
[D]efendants accepted the statements of plaintiff Kennedy that he knew nothing
about the requirement for a building having the strength he desired, and defendants gave their assurance as experienced builders that the suggested and offered
plans were sufficient for the purpose, and plaintiffs acted upon that assurance.
The evidence was competent, and the question whether defendants undertook to
construct the building for a known purpose, a building which would sustain the
designated weight, was one for the jury. If they representedthemselves as experienced and skillful in the construction ofbuildings and the designsfor such buildings
and theplaintiffs reliedupon theirjudgment, and defendants undertook the construction of the building, then the implied warranty arosethat in design and workmanship
the building should be reasonablyfit for the purpose designated
Id. at 417-18, 4 S.W.2d at 445 (emphasis added).
131. See supra notes 40-45 and accompanying text.
132. 560 S.W.2d 862 (Mo. 1978).
133. Id. at 865.
134. The court stated:
Because the contract was somewhat ambiguous on this point, the subsequent action by CBC in sending Mr. Schultheis to stake out the property and then arranging for the Conns to do the excavation and begin work on the foundation was
highly relevant in determining the reasonablenessofplaintiffs' reliance on CBC to
make any necessary modication of the foundation design as the need appeared.
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warranted both the sufficiency of the plans and the fitness of the

structure contemplated by the parties.' 35

In imposing an implied warranty standard the court expressly

rejected Custom's argument that, since it was really a builder-vendor, an implied warranty of habitability should apply.' 3 6 A
builder-vendor designs and constructs the project on his or her
property and then conveys both in a single transaction; a designerbuilder contracts to design and construct the project on the own-

er's land.137 Whereas the builder-vendor merely warrants that the
house is habitable, the designer-builder warrants that the design
provided is fit for its intended purpose.' 3 8 The court looked to the

nature of the underlying transaction; the affirmative act of sending
its employee to the building site to select a location for the struc-

ture and arranging for the construction of the foundation placed
Custom squarely in the design-build model. Entities like Custom,
therefore, should be subjected to an implied warranty of fitness
standard. When the transaction also involves the simultaneous
conveyance of the land the designer-builder should arguably also

be liable for breach of both the implied warranties of habitability
and fitness.

An implied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose was
imposed on aprofessionaldesigner-builder in Prierv. Refrigeration

EngineeringCO. 13 9 In Prier,an engineering company represented
itself as a refrigeration expert and agreed to design and install the

refrigeration system for an ice skating rink; the rink later proved
to be defective."'4 Without discussing the professional nature of
Thus, whether CBC should have known of the particular use for which the plaintiffs would use the plans and whether plaintiffs' reliance on the plans as being fit
for the use intended was reasonable were questions for the jury.
Id. at 869-70 (emphasis added).
135. Id. at 871.
136. Id. at 870. The implied warranty of habitability applies, however, only in those
jurisdictions in which the rule of caveat emptor has been abolished. See W. PROSSER,
supra note 92, at 680-82 (4th ed. 1971); Bearman, CaveatEmptor in Sales in Realt,-Recent
Assaults Upon the Rule, 14 VAND. L. REV. 541, 542 (1961).
137. See supra note 65.
138. 560 S.W.2d at 870-71. In transactions involving the sale of real property, most
jurisdictions have followed the doctrine of merger. Under the merger doctrine, the contract
for the sale of the improvement merges with the deed which conveys ownership to the land
and subjects the transaction to property, not contract, principles. See Note, Builder-Vendor
Liability for ConstructionDefects in Houses, 55 MARQ. L. REV. 369, 372 (1972). But see
Smith v. Old Warson Dev. Co., 479 S.W.2d 795, 800 (Mo. 1972) (doctrine of merger not
applicable in states where implied warranty is a tort, not contract, concept).
139. 74 Wash. 2d 25, 442 P.2d 621 (1968).
140. Id. at 26-27, 442 P.2d at 622-23.
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the designer-builder, the court held that the owner's reliance upon
the designer-builder's representations during selection' 4' created
an implied warranty of fitness that the project would be suitable
for the purpose intended. 4 1 When an architect engages in a design-build contract, his or her professional status and the enhanced ability to control the construction afforded by the designbuild format, without any further representations regarding specific abilities, may be a sufficient "holding out," or representation,
on which the owner could rely. There is an implicit representation, based upon the architect's professional status and control position, that he or she is competent in the intricacies of the
construction industry. Mere professional status alone, therefore,
should not bar the imposition of an implied warranty standard on
the architect designer-builder.
The implied warranty applies notwithstanding the presence of
the same indeterminate factors confronting the traditional architect.14 3 The distinction in the case of a designer-builder, however,
is that participation in all phases of the project-planning, design,
and construction-enablesgreater control and ability to mitigate
the effects of these indeterminate factors.'" Moreover, the imposition of an implied warranty standard treats similarly situated professional and nonprofessional designer-builders equally.
C.

The Architect Designer-Builderand Strict Liability in Tort

An implied warranty standard of liability will not provide relief to all parties injured by an architect designer-builder. 14 The
141. A recent survey illustrates the importance of such reliance. The survey reported
that the principle criteria by which one particular design-build firm was selected over another when all other factors regarding price were relatively equal was experience with the
specific type of project and satisfactory prior work for that owner. See supra note 7 1.
142. The court stated:
The evidence shows that defendant designed the base upon which the ice sheet
rested, and that the base was an inseparable part of the refrigeration system.
Where a person holds himself out as qualified to furnish, and does furnish, specifications and plans for a construction project, he thereby impliedly warrants their
sufficiency for the purpose in view ...
[D]efendant made warranties, implied in law if not express, that it would construct an ice sheet upon a base designed by it, which would reasonably function as
an ice skating arena.
74 Wash. 2d at 29, 442 P.2d at 622-23.
143. The Waliarvi court reasoned that architects deal with imprecise and random variables, and thus should not be subjected to an implied warranty standard. See supra notes
43-44 and accompanying text.
144. See supra notes 79-81 and accompanying text.
145. Some courts impose a privity restriction on the imposition of an implied warranty
of habitability on a builder-vendor. The courts state that the first purchaser might agree to
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analytical focus of an implied warranty action is upon the actions
of the parties involved 14 6 -the seller's representations and the
purchaser's subsequent reliance-and not upon the defect which
caused the injury itself. The specific actions of the parties thus
may prevent the compensation of some injured parties.' 4 7 A strict
liability in tort standard, however, where the focus of inquiry is on
the defect itself and the product's relative danger to all parties,

would represent the ultimate liability that may be imposed upon
the architect designer-builder.
1. Yhe Policy Considerations
Strict liability in tort is commonly applied to manufacturers of
mass-produced products 148 under the assumption that the manufacturer is in a better position to control and spread the costs incurred by injured consumers.' 4 9 The articulated policy goals
behind this cost or risk distribution include spreading the risk
among the broadest possible base, imposing the risk on those
"most able" to pay; and burdening the enterprise that created the
50
risk.1
compromise the quality of the building in exchange for a reduction in purchase price. If
those compromises become the substance of an implied warranty of habitability action by a
subsequent vendee, it would create an inequitable burden upon the builder-vendor. See
Halliday v. Greene, 244 Cal. App. 2d 482, 53 Cal. Rptr. 267 (1966); Wright v. Creative
Corp., 30 Colo. App. 575, 498 P.2d 1179 (1972); Oliver v. City Builders, Inc., 303 So. 2d 466
(Miss. 1974).
The Restatement identifies the difficulty ofjudicial interpretation of the basis of implied
warranty-contract or tort:
A number of courts, seeking a theoretical basis for the liability, have resorted
to a "warranty," either running with the goods sold, by analogy to covenants
running with the land, or made directly to the consumer without contract. In
some instances this theory has proved to be an unfortunate one. Although warranty was in its origin a matter of tort liability, and it is generally agreed that a
tort action will still lie for its breach, it has become so identified in practice with a
contract of sale between the plaintiff and the defendant that the warranty theory
has become something of an obstacle to the recogniton of the strict liability where
there is no such contract.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A comment m (1965).
146. See supra note 115 and accompanying text.
147. Cf. F. HARPER & F. JAMES, 2 LAW OF TORTS 794 (1956) (some innocent victims of
dangerous activities will go uncompensated when negligence is sole basis for recovery).
148. See Lehr, supra note 39, at 439.
149. See generally Cowan, Some Policy Basis ofProducts Liability, 17 STAN. L. REV.
1077 (1965) (survey of reasons why strict liability is replacing negligence in products liability law).
150. See Calabresi, Some Thoughts on Risk Distributionand the Law of Torts, 70 YALE
LJ. 499 (1961) (discussing the differences between these goals and their ability to accomplish their stated objective through the imposition of compensation costs upon the manufacturer of the defective product). The author states:
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Three basic justifications support this imposition of strict liability on the manufacturer. First, through its control over manufacturing and distribution processes, the manufacturer can best
spread the defective product's costs to all its customers.' 5 1 Second, the manufacturer is better able financially to bear the burden
because it derives profits from production of the defective product. 5' Finally, by imposing this burden on the manufacturer, the
costs of compensating injured consumers are reflected in producand demand, an
tion costs and, through the interaction of supply
53
reached.
is
product
the
of
output
optimal
In refusing to extend strict liability in tort to traditional architects, courts have determined that these underlying policies do not
apply to the same extent as they do to manufacturers. 15 TradiThe advantages of interpersonal loss spreading would probably be stated in terms
of two propositions; (a) that taking a large sum of money from one person is more
likely to result in economic dislocation, and therefore in secondary or avoidable
losses, than taking a series of small sums from many people, and (b) that even if
the total economic dislocation is the same, many small losses are preferable to one
large one, simply because people feel they suffer less if 10,000 of them lost $1 than
if one loses $10,000.
Id. at 517.
151. Id.
152. This is another way of describing the "deep pocket" theory which has justifiably
fallen into disfavor. The theory's basic tenet is that a dollar to a rich man is worth less than
a dollar to a poor man, implying that the rich man should bear the costs of injury. See
Calabresi, supra note 150, at 527.
153. See id. at 500-17. The internalization of compensation costs allows the consumer
of the product, in his or her consumption decision, to determine the relative worth of the
product as a function of its price. Id. If the product's price exceeds its relative worth to
that consumer, the decision is made not to consume. When consumers decide not to
purchase, the decreased demand causes a decrease in production, yielding an optimal output of the product. Without such a process, the product's price would only represent production and distribution costs- not the cost of compensating injured consumers. Thus, the
internalization of compensation costs prevents the subsidization of defective products by
injured consumers. Id. at 502.
154. See supra notes 50-60 and accompanying text. The central argument of this Note
is that the designer-builder's product should be subject to strict liability in tort. It is argued, however, that the Uniform Commercial Code (U.C.C.) is equally applicable. See
Shanker, Strict Tort Theory of ProductsLiability and the Uniform Commercial Code: A
Commentary on JurisprudentialEclipses, Pigeonholes and Communication Barriers, 17 W.
RES. L. REv. 5 (1965); Shanker, A Case of Judicial Chutzpah (The JudicialAdoption of
Strict Tort ProductsLiability Theory), I1 AKRON L. REv. 697 (1978); Shanker, A Reexamination of Prosser's ProductsLiability Crossword Game: The Strict or Stricter Liability of
Commercial Code Sales Warranty, 29 CASE W. REs. L. REv. 550 (1979) [hereinafter cited
as Shanker,A Reexamination]. Since the U.C.C. under § 2-102 (1978), applies to "transactions in goods," it is not possible to apply the U.C.C. to the designer-builder/owner transaction. U.C.C. § 2-105(l) (1978) defines "goods" as "all things (including specially
manufactured goods) which are movable at the time of identification to the contract for
sale." Although the U.C.C. does define "goods" to include some things which are attached
to realty, they are limited to things "capable of severance without material harm thereto."
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tional architects may be in the least advantagious position to
spread the costs of compensating injured persons."' Moreover,
Id. § 2-107(2) (1978). Therefore, since the "goods" sold in a design-build transaction-buildings--are not severable from the realty without material harm, the U.C.C.
would not seem to apply.
Although the U.C.C. does not directly apply to the design-build model, it may be applicable by analogy through a broader reading of the word "goods." Professor Shanker, a
leading Uniform Commercial Code commentator, observes that strict liability in tort
evolved due to a general feeling that the requirements of sales law-privity, waiver, and
notice-were denying consumers basic legal protection in defective products cases,
Shanker, A Reexamination, supra, at 560; a strict liability standard based in tort law was
advocated which would be, in Prosser's words, "free from the intricacies of sales law."
Prosser, The Assault Upon the Citadel(StrictLiability to the Consumer), 69 YALE L.J. 1099,
1133-34 (1960). The strict tort liability standard proposed and subsequently codified in
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A was advanced prior to the adoption of the U.C.C. in
a majority ofjurisdictions. Thus, it is argued, strict liability in tort ignores the advancements which the U.C.C. brought to the "intricacies of sales law." See Shanker, A Reexamination, supra, at 572-73.
Professor Shanker argues that the provisions of the U.C.C. apply notwithstanding the
existence of reliance upon any representations made by the merchant--the designerbuilder. See ShankerA Reexamination,supraat 562. This result is reached by application
of U.C.C. § 1-201(11) (1978), which provides that any rule of law which operates to bind
the parties into a sales agreement-such as other U.C.C. provisions-automatically becomes part of the contract between them. Thus, the provisions of U.C.C. § 2-314 requiring
the "goods" to be merchantable "if the seller is a merchant with respect to goods of that
kind," U.C.C. § 2-314(l) (1978), are applicable to all U.C.C. transactions. The U.C.C.'s
implied warranty of merchantability, therefore, applies to the same transactions in the
same manner as does the standard in § 402A, which applies if "the seller is engaged in the
business of selling such a product." See Shanker, A Reexamination, supra, at 562-63.
The U.C.C. does provide for the possibility of a waiver of§ 2-314's implied warranty of
merchantability through U.C.C. § 2-316 (1978). Section 2-316 provides for a limited or
total waiver of express or implied warranties. The use of a waiver provision, especially as
applied against injured third parties, is pointed out as a major factor in the judicial acceptance of a strict liability in tort standard. The courts, however, have allowed contractual
waiver of strict liability in tort protection "between business entities of relatively equal
bargaining strength." See Keystone Aeronautics Corp. v. R.J. Enstrom Corp., 499 F.2d
146, 149 (3d Cir. 1974). Any attempt, however, to eliminate the U.C.C. imposed warranties
in the case of injured consumers would be governed by U.C.C. § 2-719(3) (1978), which
makes prime facie unconscionable any attempt to limit consequential damages for physical
injury. Even those consumers who are not in privity with the merchant are assured of this
protection through U.C.C. § 2-318, Alternatives B or C, which extends the U.C.C.'s protection to "any natural person who may reasonably be expected to use, consume or be affected
by the goods." U.C.C. § 2-318 (1978).
Since the U.C.C.'s provisions have liberally modified "the intricacies of sales law" to
provide for recovery in situations where recovery would have been denied in pre-U.C.C.
cases-through the use of waiver, privity, or notice-the use of a strict liability in tort
standard as an exclusive standard of recovery is questioned. Although the U.C.C. has no
direct application to the design-build model, it is possible to argue for the U.C.C.'s application by analogy. Thus, the users and consumers of the designer-builder's product would
have the benefit of the provisions of the U.C.C. in any action for damages to person or
property.
155. See Merritt, supra note 79, at 389. In discussing the assumption that the owner is
the typical consumer, the author states:

CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 33:116

while the consumer of mass-produced products is not generally

familiar with the manufacturing and distribution processes, the
purchaser of traditional architectural services can readily identify
the parties involved in the project through the existence of contractual relationships between the owner, architect, and contractor. 156 While strict liability in tort may be justifiably imposed on
the goods manufacturer due to its ability to find the responsible
party and seek indemnification,157 this rationale may suggest
holding the purchaser, not the architect, strictly liable in tort
under the traditional model. Whether strict liability in tort should
be imposed under the design-build model, therefore, depends on
whether the architect designer-builder has the attributes of a man-

ufacturer, particularly the ability to distribute risk.
2. The Designer-Builderas "Seller"
By possessing control over the planning, design, and erection
phases of the project, the designer-builder exhibits the attributes
of a manufacturer. Several courts have recognized this similarity
in the context of builder-vendors. For example, in Schpper v.
Levitt and Sons, Inc. ,158 the Supreme Court of New Jersey
deemed a builder-vendor to be a manufacturer and, thus, subject
to strict tort liability for injurious defects in its product.'5 9 In
Schiuper, the plaintiff, lessee of the original vendees, alleged that
due to a design defect in the house built by the defendant, the
Of the parties involved in a project, it is the owner who has the most at stake.
It is the owner who has invested his cash, credit, and often the plans of his business operation for years to come, in a single building. It is the owner who initiates
and secures financing for the building and determines the scope of the project and
the resources to be allocated to it. It is also the owner who determines the ultimate use of the structure or arranges to market it when completed. It is chiefly
the owner who stands to benefit over the course of years from the use of the
building, and it is the owner for whom the bulk of the profits accrue.
Justice Traynor's policy of placing the burden of risk on the party most able to
bear that burden suggests that the owner should be liable for losses occasioned by
the construction of his building. Not only is he often the most financially competent party, but it is his customers who are the ultimate beneficiaries of the building, and it is among them that the burden can best be "distributed... as a cost of
doing business." [Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 24 Cal. 2d 453, 462, 150 P.2d
336, 441 (1944) (Traynor, J., concurring).] In the manufactured chattels analogy,
it is the owner, not the architect, who is in the position most comparable to that of
the manufacturer.
Id. at 388.
156. See La Rossa v. Scientific Design Co., 402 F.2d 937, 942 (3d Cir. 1968); City of
Mounds View v. Walijarvi, 263 N.W.2d 420, 425 (Minn. 1978).
157. See Lehr, supra note 38, at 440 (quoting Calabresi, supra note 150, at 506-07).
158. 44 N.J. 70, 207 A.2d 314 (1965).
159. Id. at 90, 207 A.2d at 325.
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plaintiff's son was badly scalded by excessively hot water from the
bathroom faucet.' 6 ' The court analogized Levitt's mass production and sale of residences to the mass production and sale of
automobiles, reasoning that the same policy arguments supported

the imposition of a strict liability in tort standard on automobile

manufacturers and builder-vendors.' 6' Purchasers of mass-produced homes were seen as no more able to protect themselves

through the deed than were purchasers of automobiles through
the bill of sale.' 62 The court expressly held that when an entity is
"the architect, the engineer, the planner, the designer, the builder,
and the contractor' 63 with large scale operations, it is a "manu-

facturer" and, therefore, subject to strict liability.
A strict tort standard was imposed on another builder-vendor
in Kriegler v. Eichler Homes, Inc. 1' The builder-vendor in
Kriegler installed a radiant heating system in a development
home. The system's tubing, which was constructed of steel due to
a shortage of copper during the Korean War, corroded due to improper placement in the concrete floor slab. 165 Eicher, the
builder-vendor, had constructed over 4000 homes using this par-

ticular radiant heating system.' 66 Applying the Schopper rationale, the court held Eichler strictly liable in tort. 167 The court
stated that public interest requires that the developer responsible
better situated economically must bear the refor the defect16and
8

sulting

costs.

Both the Schipper and Kriegler courts, by emphasizing the
160. Id. at 76-77, 207 A.2d at 317-18. The plaintiff alleged that Levitt failed to separate the hot water used for domestic purposes from the higher temperature water supplied
for heating purposes or, alternatively, to install a mixing valve to solve the problem. Id.,
207 A.2d at 318.
161. Id. at 90, 207 A.2d at 325.
162. Id. at 91, 207 A.2d at 326.
163. Id. at 80, 207 A.2d at 320.
164. 269 Cal. App. 2d 224, 74 Cal. Rptr. 749 (1969).
165. Id. at 225-26,74 Cal. Rptr. at 751. While the use of steel pipe as a component of a
radiant heating system is not defective per se, it does require greater care during installation than copper pipe. In Kriegler, Eichler's installation of the steel pipe was faulty and as
a result corrosion occurred causing the radiant heating system to fail. Id. at 226, 74 Cal.
Rptr. at 75 1.
166. Id.
167. The court stated:
We think, in terms of today's society, there are no meaningful distinctions
between Eichler's mass production and sale of homes and the mass production
and sale of automobiles and that the pertinent overriding policy considerations
are the same.
Id. at 227, 74 Cal. Rptr. at 752.
168. Id. at 228, 74 Cal. Rptr. at 753.
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mass production characteristics of the defendants' respective businesses, analogized a builder-vendor to a mass manufacturer of
products. More recent decisions, however, instead of examining
mass manufacturing techniques, focus on determining whether the
builder-vendor is a "seller" or "in the business of selling."'169 In
Avner v. Longridge Estates,7 0 for instance, a builder-vendor who
71
was not a mass developer was subjected to strict tort liability.'
InAvner, the defendant-developer bought land, subdivided it into
lots, and sold one of the lots to the plaintiff. Settlement caused by
the decomposition of organic fill material and inadequate compaction during lot preparation damaged the house the plaintiff
had built on the lot.' 7 2 The defendant argued that building lot
developers are not analogous to mass manufacturers of goods.
The Avner court rejected this argument, reasoning that the techniques used to develop building lots, like those used to mass produce goods, are routine and standardized.' 73 The court was
unable to distinguish the defendant's responsibilities from those of
the builder-vendor in Kriegler.7 4 The court determined, therefore, that a builder-vendor of improvements to property was
analogous to a builder-vendor of property itself, for purposes of
imposing liability for defects, 17 declaring that "the manufacturer
of a lot may be held strictly liable in tort for damages suffered by
the owner as a proximate result of any defects in the manufactur' 176
ing process."
The Avner court, without considering the size of the developer's operations as bearing on its liability, merely characterized
that operation as "the manufacturing of lots."' 77 Thus the developer was sufficiently linked to "the business of selling" to justify
imposing the strict liability standard. Avner, therefore, may suggest a shift from the factual inquiry of the mass distribution poten169. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, § 402A(l)(a) (1965); supra note 50.

170. 272 Cal. App. 2d 607, 77 Cal. Rptr. 633 (1969).
171. Id. at 615, 77 Cal. Rptr. at 639.
172. Id. at 609, 77 Cal. Rptr. at 635.
173. Id. at 615, 77 Cal. Rptr. at 639.

174. Id.
175. The court stated:
We are unable to distinguish the obligation of a builder to a purchaser for a defective radiant heating system installed in a cement floor slab. . . from the obligation of a manufacturerofa lot to a purchaser for defective subsurface conditions
resulting from improper filling and grading that cause instability.
Id. (emphasis added).
176. Id.
177. Id.
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tial of builder-vendors to a mere assumption that the buildervendor is per se better situated to spread
and control risks associ78
ated with defects in their products.
The absence of a realty transfer in a designer-builder transaction distinguishes it from the builder-vendor transaction. This
distinction might, arguably, make a court less reluctant to impose
strict tort liability on designer-builders than on builder-vendors.
As illustrated in the implied warranty area, however, this distinction has not resulted in the imposition of a higher standard of
liability to designer-builders. 179 It may be inferred, however, that
the expansion of strict liability in tort to builder-vendors may signal an extension of that same liability to designer-builders.
This inference was tested in Abdul-Warith v. Arthur G.McKee
and Co.,i"' where the issue was whether a strict liability in tort

standard should extend to a professional designer-builder. The
court held that the defendant engineering-construction firm's liability would be determined under a strict tort standard,' 8' finding
that the defendant was "an engineering and contracting firm,
which designed and constructed the skip bridge under a con-

tract."' t8 2 The complaint urged the application of section 402A of
the Restatement (Second) of Torts' 3 to hold the designer-builder
strictly liable for creating an "unreasonably dangerous" skip
bridge which injured the plaintiff. 8 4 The court rejected the defendant's contention that it was not a section 402A seller, reasoning that the company did not qualify under the section 402A
established service exemption."3 5 The court, characterizing the
transaction as a hybrid in which the defendant supplied both services and the skip bridge noted that
where the architect or engineer simply provides the design or
merely supervises, without actually participating in, the construction of the challenged product, he has not been held
strictly liable; where, however, theprofessionalactually assembles
178. See Note, supra note 109, at 320-21.
179. See supra text accompanying notes 136-38.
180. 488 F. Supp. 306 (E.D. Pa. 1980).
181. Id. at 310-11.
182. Id. at 308 (emphasis added). A skip bridge is an assembly which carries materials
from the stockhouse to the blast furnace. The defendant, McKee, designed and installed
the skip bridge from specifications and materials supplied by the owner, U.S. Steel. The
parties in this transaction resemble the competitive bid design-build model involving an
integrated services entity. See supra note 65.
183. See supra note 51.

184. 488 F. Supp. at 308.
185. Id.; see supra notes 50-58 and accompanying text.
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or erects the allegedy defective item, strictliability will attach .t86

The defendant in McKee asserted that, unlike a large, mass
producer of goods, it was not better situated to distribute the cost
of compensating injured consumers. The court rejected this argument, stating that "the volume of a defendant's sales is irrelevant
to characterization as a seller;"' 8 7 instead, the proper inquiry was
whether the designer-builder "carried on an established and well-

recognized kind of business"' 8 8 which was regularly maintained.
Finding that McKee had so carried on an established business, the
court found that it was a section 402A seller and, therefore, strictly
liable in tort.'8 9 McKee represents a significant shift in emphasis
from that in Sch#7per 9 and Kriegler.19 1 Instead of examining the

ability of the designer-builder to spread compensation costs to the
consumers of its product, the McKee court assumes that the enterprise has that capacity merely by engaging "in the business of selling" that particular product. 192 The court, therefore, imposes as a

precondition to operating as a designer-builder, an obligation to
accept the consequences of defects in its products, regardless 19of3
ability to spread or distribute the costs created by these defects.
186. 488 F. Supp. at 310-11 n.3 (emphasis added). This reasoning is in marked contrast to the Stuart holding. See supra notes 96-101 and accompanying text. The court in
Stuart, by focusing on the profesional qualifications of the designer-builder, instead of the
actual services provided, refused to impose even an implied warranty standard of liability.
187. 488 F. Supp. at 311.
188. Id. (quoting Stewart v. Uniroyal, Inc., 72 Pa. D.&C.2d 179, 202 (C.P. Allegheny
County 1974), aj'd, 233 Pa. Super. 761, 339 A.2d 815 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1975)).
189. Id.
190. See supra notes 158-63 and accompanying text.
191. See supra notes 163-68 and accompanying text.
192. Conversely, if the enterprise does not have sufficient internal cost spreading capacity, insurance is available which would spread the cost among all designer-builders as a
class. Even with the internal inconsistencies associated with the use of insurance as a cost
spreading, or more likely, a cost distributing device, enterprise liability demands that the
enterprise bear all the costs associated with that enterprise. See generally James, Accident
Liabilit Reconsidered- The Impact of Liability Insurance, 57 YALE L.J. 549 (1948) (examining the benefits to society of loss spreading by enterprises through insurance).
193. In response to the situation where the costs of product defects has exceeded the
ability of the enterprise to assimilate, either through internal cost spreading devices or external cost distributing insurance, Professor Morris states:
The answer given is that the entrepreneur should have adequately funded or insured. The entrepreneur must make provision for the costs of his enterprise or
suffer financial failure. The law makes the risk of enterprise liability a cost of the
enterprise. The entrepreneur who does not make provision for this cost should
fail, just as one who does not provide for his labor cost or for interest on his
borrowed capital will be put out of business. As Professor Ehrenzweig puts it, the
law should not concern itself with the uninsured enterpreneur, but should decree
liability in areas where "the defendant could reasonably be expected to carry such
insurance."
Morris, Enterprise Liability and the ActuarialProcess-TheInsignifcance of Foresight, 70
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If the designer-builder is forced to absorb the costs associated
with product defects as merely another cost of doing business
upon entry, 9 4 any inquiry into its past experience as a designbuild entity would be, arguably, irrelevant. Moreover, since the
architect is already familiar with the risks inherent in the building
industry, there would be a stronger argument for imposing strict
liability in tort when he or she enters the design-build model.

This result is partially based upon architects' experience and ability to foresee and minimize costs arising from their actions. Thus,
the analysis should be directed at whether the designer-builder is
a "seller" and is "in the business of selling," thatparticularprod95
uct, notwithstanding whether they have done so in the past.1
3. Buildings as "Products"
If the architect designer-builder is a "seller. . . engaged in the
business of selling,"' 9 6 does he or she produce a section 402A
"product"? This issue was addressed in Cox v. Shaffer, 19 7 where
the plaintiff alleged that the defendant-designer-builder's grain
silo, which was manufactured without ventilation, was an unrea-

sonably dangerous product subject to a strict liability in tort standard. 19 The court, without discussion, held that the silo was not a
product within section 402A "by virtue of its very clear language."' 19 9 Expressly stating that any building attached to the

owner's property is not a product,2 "o the court found section 402A
inapplicable because no "product" was involved, notwithstanding
YALE L.J. 554, 556 (1961) (quoting Ehrenzweig,Assurance Oblige-A Comparative Study,
15 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 445, 451 (1950)).
194. Id.
195. The court in McKee recognized this theoretical discrepancy between the policy
rationale underlying strict liability in tort and how that standard is implemented; it felt
constrained, however, by the textual limitations imposed by the language of § 402A. The
court stated that Pennsylvania courts had generally been expansive in holding strictly liable
suppliers of products based upon their special responsibility to the consuming public. It
determined that the application of § 402A in Pennsylvania, however, required the exclusion of the occasional seller from its provisions. 488 F. Supp. at 310.
196. REsTATEmENT (SECOND) OF TORTs § 402A(l)(a) (1965); see supra note 51.
197. 223 Pa. Super. 429, 302 A.2d 456 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1973).
198. Id. at 430, 302 A.2d at 456.
199. .d. at 431,302 A.2d at 457. The court felt that the "clear" language of § 402A was
so explicit on this point that there was no reason to discuss the policy rationales underlying
products liability. Moreover, the court reasoned that the requirement of an oxygen free
environment inside any silo was a question of fact for the jury in a negligence action. Id. at
430-32, 302 A.2d at 456-57.
200. Id. at 431, 302 A.2d at 457.
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a determination that the designer-builder was a seller engaged in
the business of selling.
A similar result was reached in Lowrie v. City of Evanston.201
In Lowrie, the plaintiff's complaint alleged the defective design,
construction, and operation of an open-air parking garage.2 "2 The
court determined that the question whether the parking garage
was a product under section 402A required consideration of the

public policy rationales underlying strict liability in tort.20 In
holding that the parking garage was not a "product" within section 402A, 2 4 the court distinguished Lowrie from Sch7per20 5 and

Kriegler,20 6 reasoning that strict liability in tort was imposed in
those cases on contractors who sold defective products in addition
to the house; stating that in neither instance was the house itself
determined to be a product. 20 7 The Lowrie court, therefore, was

trying to differentiate between defects within the components
of a
208
finished product and defects in the product itself.
201. 50 Ill. App. 3d 376, 365 N.E.2d 923 (1977).
202. Id. at 378, 365 N.E.2d at 924-25.

203. The court treated the issue of whether a "building" such as a parking garage is a
"product" as one of first impression. Undertaking a lengthy analysis of the word "product"
as defined in § 402A, the court determined that the application of that section to different
types of products is based on the ability of that particular product to satisfy the public
policy rationales underlying § 402A. Id. at 383, 365 N.E.2d at 928.
204. The court stated:
We have considered those underlying policy reasons in their relation to the
development of the strict products liability concept, and we have come to the
conclusion that a building such as is involved here is not a product within the
meaning of the use of that term in § 402A.
Id. at 384, 365 N.E.2d at 928. The text of their discussion did not appear in the opinion,
nor did the court explain why it felt that a parking garage failed to meet the underlying
public policy rationales of products liability.
205. See supra notes 158-63 and accompanying text.
206. See supra notes 164-68 and accompanying text.
207. Id. at 383, 365 N.E.2d at 928.
208. This fallacious argument appears to be a distinction without substance. It is difficult to find a product more integrated into a building than a radiant heating system imbedded in the concrete floor slab. See Kriegler v. Eichler Homes, Inc., 269 Cal. App. 2d 224,
74 Cal. Rptr. 749 (1969); supra notes 164-68 and accompanying text. Almost every product
is merely an arrangement of components and the failure of one is a failure of the product as
a whole. One policy rationale underlying the development of strict liability in tort was the
inability of the consumer vis- a-vis the manufacturer to control and spread the risks and
costs associated with defective products. See supra notes 148-49 & 151 and accompanying
text. The consumer's position has not changed relative to the manufacturer when the defect involves the product as a whole rather than merely one component part. This analysis,
however, merely begs the question: when is the product itself defective? When every component part is defective? If this is not the case, then one defective component part would
create a defective product.
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The court in McKee,2 ° 9 similarly, faced the issue whether the
skip bridge was a product under section 402A.2 10 Although the
court avoided this issue by finding that the skip bridge was not
defective,21 ' it did discuss the bridge's status as a section 402A
product in dicta.2 12 The court reasoned that the distinction made
in Cox and Lowrie between "buildings" and "products" was that
"buildings" constituted real property. "As real property," the Mc-

Kee court observed, "in contradistinction to a chattel or a piece of
equipment, the silo would be beyond the purview of section
402A."2 3 Therefore, the court reasoned that merely because
"buildings" are characterized as real property, they are not prod-

ucts under section 402A, regardless of whether the land was also
conveyed in the original transaction.

Moorman Manufacturing Co. v. National Tank Co.,14 like
Cox,2" 5 addressed the issue whether a grain silo is a product
under section 402A. Undertaking a lengthy analysis of the public
policy underpinnings of strict liability, 2 16 the court labeled the

grain silo a "product," noting that "[t]he mere fact that the tank
has apparently become a part of the real estate is not, of itself,
sufficient reason to say that it is not a product." 2 17 The court,
therefore, expressly found that since the policy underpinnings of

strict tort liability fit the situation, such liability would attach to
209. Abdul-Warith v. Arthur G. McKee and Co., 488 F. Supp. 306 (E.D. Pa. 1980); see
supra notes 180-93 and accompanying text.
210. 488 F. Supp. at 312.
211. Id. at 312-13.
212. Id. at 311-12.
213. Id. at 312.
214. 92 I11. App. 3d 136, 414 N.E.2d 1302 (1980).
215. See supra notes 197-200 and accompanying text.
216. The court focused on the superior ability of the manufacturer, vis-a-vis the consumer, to spread the costs of defective products, stating that
[w]hen a manufacturer has placed a faulty product into the stream of commerce and the buyer has paid the price demanded, the manufacturer who has
reaped a profit is the most appropriate party to bear the loss ....
The manufacturer of a faulty product is in the position to spread the cost of that fault to other
buyers or to insure against such cost. Of course, a manufacturer may put into the
stream of commerce so many faulty products that it can no longer obtain insurance or must price its goods too high to compete in the marketplace. We cannot,
however, see any evil in a rule of law that compels a manufacturer in one way or
another to refrain from putting worthless goods onto the market.
Id. at 143, 414 N.E.2d at 1308-09. The court, thus, expressly adopted an enterprise liability
standard. This standard assumes that the manufacturer is in the best position to distribute
the costs associated with defective products. See supra notes 149-52 and accompanying
text.
217. 92 111.App. 3d at 146, 414 N.E.2d at 1311.
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the designer-builder's product notwithstanding its attachment to
real property.
The public policy rationales clearly support the application of
strict liability in tort to the designer-builder's product regardless
of any attachment of that "product" to real property. The manufacturer is still in the better position to control, spread, and distribute the costs associated with defective products regardless of
whether they are attached to real property. Moreover, the manufacturer is still the party that introduced the product into the marketplace and, thus, should bear the risk as merely another cost of
production. Therefore, the "product" of designer-builders--"buildings"-should be within the ambit of a strict liability
in tort standard for defects within that "product."
Under the design-build model, therefore, the architect's role is
fundamentally different than that under the traditional model.2" 8
The architect designer-builder exerts control over both the design
and construction phases of the project.21 9 This increased control,
examined under the public policy rationales underlying strict liability in tort, 220 justify the imposition of that standard on the architect designer-builder.
III.

CONCLUSION

Because most courts feel that traditional architects cannot control indeterminant design factors, they are reluctant to hold them
liable to higher than a negligence standard. 22' The traditional architect is usually judged by the professional standard 2 2 2-- how the
average architect would have responded in the same situation.
Thus, the courts have deemed it more equitable for the purchasers
of architectural services to absorb the costs of defects not caused
223
by the architect's negligence.
When the architect engages in the design-build model, however, there should be a reexamination of this refusal to impose
either an implied warranty or strict liability in tort standard.
Under the design-build model, the architect designer-builder has
complete control over the planning, design, and construction of
the project and, therefore, is in a better position to control these
218.
219.
220.
221.
222.
223.

See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 78-82 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 148-57 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 40-45 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 28-32 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 40-45 and accompanying text.
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factors than a traditional architect. 224 When the architect is operating the design-build entity as a principal, and is not merely a
traditional architect employed by the design-build entity, the rationales justifying a negligence only standard of liability are absent.2 25 Some courts have imposed an implied warranty of fitness
on designer-builders. 226 Transactions involving designer-builders
should be distinguished from those involving builder-vendors,
where an implied warranty of habitability is applied. The underlying rationales, however, apply with equal validity to both designer-builders and builder-vendors.22 7
Notwithstanding the willingness to impose an implied warranty standard to a designer-builder, courts have resisted any further expansion of liability.2 28 By examining the underlying policy
considerations justifying the application of strict liability in tort to
a manufacturer it is apparent that the designer-builder should also
face a strict liability in tort standard for defective products.2 29
Designer-builders, whether professionals or nonprofessionals,
are also "sellers," 0 and their product-a "building"--is also a
"product" under section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of
Torts.2" 3 ' Section 402A should apply if examination of the public
policy considerations underlying strict liability in tort justify imposition. An architect designer-builder is a "seller" who is "engaged in the business of selling" a product. If the designerbuilder's "product" has an "unreasonably dangerous" defect
which causes injury, then a strict liability in tort standard should
be used to evaluate that designer-builder's liability.
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See supra notes
See supra notes
See supra notes
See supra notes
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78-79 and accompanying text.
113-17 and accompanying text.
118-38 and accompanying text.
136-38 and accompanying text.
154-57 and accompanying text.
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